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Although severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
is highly infectious in clinical settings, SARS has not been
well examined in household settings. The household and
household member attack rates were calculated for 1,214
SARS case-patients and their household members, strati-
fied by two phases of the epidemic. A case-control analysis
identified risk factors for secondary infection. Secondary
infection occurred in 14.9% (22.1% versus 11% in earlier
and later phases) of all households and 8% (11.7% versus
5.9% in the earlier and later phases) of all household mem-
bers. Healthcare workers’ households were less likely to be
affected. Risk factors from the multivariate analysis includ-
ed at-home duration before hospitalization, hospital visita-
tion to the SARS patient (and mask use during the visit),
and frequency of close contact. SARS transmission at the
household level was not negligible in Hong Kong.
Transmission rates may be greatly reduced with precau-
tionary measures taken by household members of SARS
patients.
T
he first large-scale severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) outbreak occurred in the Prince of Wales
Hospital in Hong Kong on approximately March 11, 2003
(1,2). It was followed by a large-scale community outbreak
in the Amoy Gardens Estate, which had a total of 321
SARS cases as of April 15, 2003; 41.0% were in Block E
residents (3) . Environmental transmission of SARS was
most likely primarily responsible for the Amoy Gardens
outbreak (4,5) . As of May 31, 2003, a total of 1,739 sus-
pected or confirmed SARS cases were reported in Hong
Kong, of which 384 were in hospital workers (22.1%) and
approximately 321 were in residents of the Amoy Gardens
(6) (Figure).
In the clinical setting, a very high attack rate of the
SARS virus has been observed (7,8). However, few data
describe the attack rates in community settings. The first
objective of the study is to estimate the household attack
rates and the household member attack rates for different
categories of SARS patients. The second objective is to




The study population comprised all SARS case-patients
who were reported to the Department of Health on or
before May 16, 2003 (n = 1,690), and their household
members (including kin, nonkin, and domestic helpers).
In Hong Kong, confirmed or suspected SARS patients
were defined as those with radiographic evidence of infil-
trates consistent with pneumonia, and fever >38°C degrees
any time in the preceding 2 days, and at least two of the
following symptoms: 1) history of chills in the past 2 days,
2) cough or breathing difficulty, 3) general malaise or
myalgia, or 4) known history of exposure (9). This defini-
tion is the same as that of the World Health Organization
for probable cases (8).
In this study, an index patient is defined as the SARS
case-patient who had the earliest date of fever onset with-
in a household. Household members who had an onset of
symptoms later than the index patient are considered to be
probable secondary (or tertiary) cases. Three of these cases
were hospital workers who may have contracted SARS in
the hospital setting and were hence excluded from the
analysis.
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The list of telephone numbers, as well as some demo-
graphic and clinical background information of all proba-
ble SARS cases in Hong Kong (identified on or before
May 16, 2003 [n = 1,690]), were obtained from the
Department of Health. A team of trained interviewers
called these numbers and briefed the person answering the
telephone about the nature of the study. The interviewer
then identified the person who had the earliest date of fever
onset and confirmed that the household members had not
been interviewed twice. When a household had two or
more SARS cases with the same fever onset date (11
households), one of them was randomly selected as the
index patient. Respondents were then requested to hand
the telephone to the household member (who may or may
not be the index patient) who was most familiar with the
household situation to serve as the responder. The inter-
view occurred at least 14 days after the index patient’s
onset of symptoms past the maximum incubation period of
10 days.
By using a SARS registry, a research staff member later
crosschecked that the index patient named by the intervie-
wee was, in fact, the one with the earliest onset of fever, if
there were more than one SARS case-patient in the house-
hold. In July, the names of all family members provided by
the respondents were also checked against the registry to
ensure that the study had not missed any probable second-
ary cases. This check also ensured that no duplicate inter-
views had been conducted.
The study was conducted from April 4, 2003, to June
10, 2003. Of the 1,690 probable SARS cases reported in
Hong Kong as of May 16, a total of 1,214 (72%) SARS
cases had been covered by the study (Figure). The 1,214
SARS cases came from 996 households (881 households
were analyzed and 115 single households were excluded
from the analysis). Of the remaining 476 reported SARS
cases in Hong Kong that were not covered by this study,
140 case households (8.2%) did not have a correct tele-
phone number, 163 (9.6%) could not be contacted after at
least 5 different attempts, 163 (9.6%) refused to participate
in the study, and 10 (0.6%) were not in Hong Kong or
could not communicate in Chinese or English.
Questionnaire
The study questionnaire collected the following infor-
mation: 1) Sociodemographic data about the index patient
and whether he or she resides in the Amoy Gardens (and
apartment block number), 2) Household information—
including all household members’ names, ages, gender,
and relationship with the index patient, and if they were
hospital workers, 3) Information about any “probable sec-
ondary SARS infection” among household members, 4)
Data regarding individual household members’ hospital
visits to the index patient, and 5) Data regarding close con-
tact between individual household members and the index
patient (Table 1).
Study Design
The household attack rate was defined as the number of
households with at least one probable secondary SARS
case divided by the total number of index patient’s house-
holds. The household member attack rate was defined as
the total number of all probable secondary or tertiary
SARS case-patients of all relevant index patient’s house-
holds divided by the total number of household members
(not including the index patient) of all relevant index
patient’s households.
Two analyses were performed to identify risk factors
associated with household attack rates and household
member attack rates. Households that had at least one
probable secondary infection were first compared with
those households which had no probable secondary infec-
tions in a number of risk or protective factors. To control
for any period effects, a dummy variable was created to
represent the two time periods (before March 25, 2003,
and on or after March 25, 2003). March 25 corresponds to
the beginning of the Amoy Gardens outbreak; after that
date, public awareness of SARS was greatly heightened
(10). The average number of secondary cases from one
SARS-infected person declined greatly from 2.7 in the ini-
tial part of the epidemic to 0.9 after March 25 (11). (These
figures were derived from modeling methods [instead of a
survey] and were not confined to household cases; hence,
they are not comparable to the results obtained by this
study).
The second analysis used a case-control design that
compared individual family members who were probable
secondary SARS case-patients with those who were not. To
avoid ambiguities arising from distinguishing secondary
and tertiary infections, only the “first” probable secondary
cases were used as a case in this case-control analysis, if
there were multiple SARS cases in the household. In addi-
tion, this analysis also examined the frequency of close
contacts between the case or control and the index patient
(e.g., dining together, sharing a bedroom).
Statistical Analyses
The household attack rates and the household member
attack rates were calculated separately for four groups of
index patients (hospital workers, Amoy Block E residents,
other block residents, and other community members), and
95% confidence intervals (CI) were also derived.
Univariate odds ratios and p values from chi-square test
were obtained. Stepwise multivariate logistic regression
methods using candidate variables that were, at a minimum,
marginally significant in the univariate analysis (p < 0.10)
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Table 1. Univariate association between various risk factors and Household Member Attack Rates (HMAR) 
% attack rate 
Case  Control 
Risk factor  (n = 131)  (n = 2,139)  Odds ratio (95% CI)  Chi-square p value 
Sex
a         
Male  46.6  48.3  1.00  0.701 
Female  53.4  51.7  1.07 (0.75 to 1.53)   
Age (y)
b         
18–30  46.6  46.9  1.00  0.287 
31–40  15.3  15.3  1.17 (0.68 to 2.01)   
41–50    16.2  16.3  1.04 (0.60 to 1.81)   
51–60  10.9  10.7  1.58 (0.90 to 2.76)   
>61   11.1  10.8  1.65 (0.95 to 2.86)   
Type of Index Person (IP)         
Hospital workers  7.6  33.5  1.00  <0.001
c 
Amoy Gardens Block E residents  10.7  2.8  16.99 (7.23 to 39.90)   
Amoy Gardens other Block residents   15.3  10.6  6.31 (2.91 to 13.67)   
Other community members  66.4  53.2  5.48 (2.83 to 10.61)   
Date of IP’s fever onset
d         
Before March 25  51.9  34.2  1.00  <0.001 
On or after March 25  48.1  65.8  0.48 (0.34 to 0.69)   
Duration IP stayed home between fever onset and hospitalization (d)
e 
<2  31.3  51.0  1.00  <0.001 
3–5  32.1  30.3  1.72 (1.11 to 2.68)   
>6  36.6  18.8  3.18 (2.07 to 4.90)   
IP visited by a family member during hospitalization?         
No  73.3  87.9  1.00  <0.001 
Yes  26.7  12.1  2.65 (1.76 to 3.98)   
Mask use during hospital visits by a household member
f         
Not visited by any household member  75.0  88.6  1.00  <0.001
c 
Visited, both with mask on  6.3  4.0  1.87 (0.88 to 3.96)   
Visited, one with mask on  5.5  3.6  1.78 (0.80 to 3.96)   
Visited, both without mask on  13.3  3.8  4.16 (2.37 to 7.30)   
Whether caretaker of IP         
No  64.9  82.0  1.00  <0.001 
Yes  35.1  18.0  2.47 (1.70 to 3.60)   
Whether shared room or bed with IP
g         
Never  59.7  81.3  1.00  <0.001 
Sharing room   8.9  7.3  1.66 (0.86 to 3.19)   
Sharing room and bed  31.5  11.4  3.74 (2.48 to 5.64)   
Frequency of dining together with IP
h         
Never  37.0  60.2  1.00  <0.001 
<5  21.8  18.7  1.90 (1.15 to 3.12)   
5–10  14.3  9.7  2.40 (1.35 to 4.29)   
>10  26.9  11.4  3.82 (2.38 to 6.15)   
Frequency of close contact with IP (within 1 m)
i         
Never   22.5  48.4  1.00  <0.001 
Seldom  15.0  14.7  2.19 (1.19 to 4.02)   
Occasionally  24.2  16.4  3.17 (1.85 to 5.42)   
Frequent  38.3  20.5  4.03 (2.47 to 6.56)   
Frequency coughed at by IP (within 1 meter) 
j         
Never  77.6  90.3  1.00  <0.001
3 
Seldom   6.5  4.2  1.81 (0.81 to 4.03)   
Occasionally  10.3  2.8  4.29 (2.17 to 8.48)   
Frequent  5.6  2.6  2.47 (1.03 to 5.90)   
aInformation on 31 controls missing. 
bInformation on 7 cases and 160 controls missing. 
cChi-square test exact p value. 
dInformation on 3 controls missing. 
eInformation on 6 controls missing. 
fInformation on 3 cases 18 controls missing. 
gInformation on 7 cases and 24 controls missing. 
hInformation on 12 cases and 51 controls missing.  
iInformation on 13 cases and 37 controls missing.  
jInformation on 24 cases and 98 controls missing. were conducted to obtain factors independently associated
with household attack rates and household member attack
rates. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS),
Chicago, IL, Version 11 was used for all analyses.
Results
Background Characteristics of Index Patients
Of the respondents, 54.6% were female and 45.4% were
male; most index patients were 18 to 50 years of age.
Healthcare workers represented almost one third of the
index patients and approximately 16% were Amoy
Gardens Estate residents. Two-thirds of the index patients
had fever onset during the later phase of the epidemic (on
or after March 25), and most reported hospitalization with-
in 5 days of fever onset (80.6%) and no hospital visits by
household members (77.4%) (Table 2).
Household Attack Rates
The overall household attack rate, as defined, was
14.9% (95% CI=12.6% to 17.4%) for all the households
of the 881 index patients studied. Excluding households
related to the Amoy Gardens, the household attack rate
was 13.9% (96/738). The household attack rate was much
higher for households of those index patients whose onset
of fever occurred before March 25, 2003, than for those
with onset of fever occurred on or after that date (22.4%
versus 11.0%, OR = 0.43, p = 0.001). The Amoy Block E
households had the highest household attack rate (38.9%),
followed by those living in the other blocks of the Amoy
Gardens (19.6%) and households of the “other communi-
ty member” group (18.3%). The households with index
patients who were healthcare workers had the lowest
household attack rate (3.8%). Moreover, the household
attack rates were higher for the earlier onset group as
compared to the later onset group for all the four strata
(Table 3).
Household Member Attack Rates
Among all 2,139 household members of the 881 index
patients, a total of 188 (8%, 95% CI 7.0% to 9.2%) were
probable secondary cases. The household member attack
rates for the hospital healthcare worker group, the other
community group, the Amoy non-Block E group, and the
Amoy Block E group were 1.9%, 9.8%, 11%, and 24.4%,
respectively. Excluding households related to Amoy
Gardens, the household member attack rate was 6.9%
(138/1,991). Similar period effects were observed: the
odds ratios for comparing the two fever onset groups (on
or after versus before March 25, 2003) were 0.15 (hospi-
tal healthcare worker group p = 0.004), 0.41 (other com-
munity group, p < 0.001), and 0.29 (Amoy non-Block E
group, p = 0.002). For Amoy Block E respondents, the
figures for the earlier and later onset groups were 37.1%
and 17.7%, respectively (p = 0.058) (Table 3). The median
duration between the date of onset of the index patients’
symptoms and their “first” probable secondary case was
6.5, 7.0, 2.0, and 4.0 days for the healthcare worker, other
community members, Amoy Block E, and Amoy non-
Block E groups, respectively.
Factors Associated with Household Attack Rates
While sex of the index patient was not a significant fac-
tor, older age of index patient (OR = 1.57–3.77), type of
index patient (OR = 5.74–16.35), longer duration home
stay between fever onset and hospitalization (OR =
1.76–3.91), whether any household members visited the
index patient (OR = 2.03), date of onset fever of index
patient (later versus earlier onset groups, OR = 0.43) were
all univariately associated with household attack rates
(Table 4). Disinfection of the living quarter after the index
patient’s onset of fever was, however, not a significant
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Table 2. Background characteristics of the Index Patient (IP) 
Characteristic  n  % 
Sex     
Male  400  45.4 
Female  481  54.6 
Age (y)
a     
<18  44  5.1 
18–30  239  27.8 
31–40  197  22.9 
41–50  165  19.2 
51–60  76  8.8 
>61  138  16.1 
Education level
b     
No education  60  7.1 
Primary  152  17.9 
1-F3  123  14.5 
F4-F5  208  24.5 
F6-F7  44  5.2 
University or above  263  31.0 
Type of IP     
Hospital worker   267  30.3 
Amoy Gardens Block E residents   36  4.1 
Amoy Gardens other Block residents   107  12.1 
Other community member  471  53.5 
Duration IP stayed home between fever 
onset and hospitalization (d)
c 
   
<2  440  50.1 
3–5  268  30.5 
>6  171  19.5 
IP visited by any household member 
during hospitalization 
   
No  682  77.4 
Yes  199  22.6 
Date of IP’s fever onset
d     
Before March 25  299  34.0 
On or after March 25  581  66.0 
a22 missing persons. 
b31 missing persons.
 
c2 missing persons. 
d1 missing person. factor (p = 0.88). All of these univariately significant vari-
ables except age were significant in the multivariate step-
wise logistic regression (Table 5).
Factors Associated with Household 
Member Attack Rates
As with the household attack rate, type of index
patient (OR = 5.48–16.99, Table 1), whether the individ-
ual family member had visited the index patient in the
hospital (OR= 2.65), longer duration of index patient’s
home stay (OR = 1.72 and 3.18), and index patient’s date
of fever onset (later versus earlier onset date, OR = 0.48)
were univariately significant factors distinguishing
between the case group and the control group. Moreover,
the risk for SARS transmission was greatly increased
when both the individual household member and the
index patient were not wearing a mask during the hospital
visit, (OR = 4.16, Table 1). In the univariate analyses,
variables associated with close contacts with the index
patient, such as the following: whether the was the main
caregiver of the index patient (OR = 2.47), whether the
participant shared a room or a bed with the index patient
(OR 1.66 and 3.74), frequency of dining together with the
index patient (OR 1.90 and 3.82, respectively, for those
having dined 5–10 times and >10 times during the period
between onset of fever of index patient and his or her hos-
pital admission) and frequency of being coughed on by
the index patient within one m (OR = 1.81 and 2.47,
respectively, for responses of occasionally and frequent-
ly), were also significantly associated with household
member attack rates.
In the multivariate analyses, the type of index patient
(hospital workers, other community workers, and the like)
was associated with household member attack rates, and
the directions were the same as in the univariate analyses
(Table 6). Moreover, individual household members who
had visited the index patient when neither the index patient
nor the visitor had worn a mask were more likely to have
contracted SARS, when compared to those who had not
visited the index patient (OR = 3.12, Table 6). Those
household members who had had occasional or frequent
close contacts of <1 m with the index patient were more
likely than other household members to be included in the
case group (OR = 2.14 and 2.30, Table 6). The household
members were also less likely to have the index patient’s
onset of fever occurring on or after March 25 as compared
to the control group (OR= 0.51).
Discussion
Of approximately 72% of SARS cases in Hong Kong
(as of May 16, 2003) that were covered by this investiga-
tion, approximately 15% of all index patient’s households
and 8% of all members of these households had contracted
SARS. These figures include those of the Amoy Gardens
residents. It is believed that the Block E transmissions had
primarily resulted from environmental contamination
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Table 3. Household attack rates (HAR) and household member attack rates (HMAR) for different categories of index patient 
  % attack rate 
Date IP’s fever onset 
Type of index patient  <March 25, 2003  >March 25, 2003  Overall  Odds ratio (95% CI)
a  chi-square p value 
HAR           
n = 114  n = 153  n = 267      Hospital workers 
7.0 (3.1–13.4)  1.3 (0.2–4.6)  3.8 (1.8–6.8)  0.18 (0.02 to 0.91)
b  0.021 
n=148  n = 322  n = 471      Other community members 
29.1 (21.9–37.1)  13.4 (9.8–17.6)  18.3 (14.9–22.1)  0.38 (0.23 to 0.62)  <0.001 
n = 12  n = 24  n = 36      Amoy Gardens Block E residents 
50.0 (21.1– 78.9)  33.3 (15.6–55.3)  38.9 (23.1–56.5)  0.50 (0.10, to 2.54)  0.441
c 
n = 25  n = 82  n = 107      Amoy Gardens other  
Block residents   40.0 (21.1–61.3)  13.4 (6.9–22.7)  19.6 (12.6–28.4)  0.23 (0.07, 0.72)  0.008
c 
n = 299  n = 581  n = 881      All households of all IP 
22.4 (17.8–27.6)  11.0 (8.6–13.9)  14.9 (12.6–17.4)  0.43 (0.29, 0.63)  <0.001 
HMAR           
n = 349  n = 381  n = 730      Hospital workers 
3.4 (1.8–5.9)  0.5 (0.06–1.9)  1.9 (1.1–3.2)  0.15 (0.02, 0.67)
b  0.004 
n = 392  n = 866  n = 1,261      Other community members 
15.8 (12.4–19.8)  7.2 (5.5–9.1)  9.8 (8.3–11.6)  0.41 (0.28, 0.61)  <0.001 
n = 27  n = 51  n = 78      Amoy Gardens residents  
(Block E)  37.0 (19.4–57.6)  17.7 (8.4–30.9)  24.4 (15.4–35.4)  0.36 (0.11, 1.19)  0.058 
n = 59  n = 196  n = 255      Amoy Gardens residents  
(non-Block E)  22.0 (12.3–34.7)  7.7 (4.4–12.3)  11.0 (7.4–15.5)  0.29 (0.12, 0.71)  0.002 
n = 827  n = 1,494  n = 2,324      All households of all IP 
11.7 (9.6–14.1)  5.9 (4.8–7.2)  8.0 (6.9–9.1)  0.47 (0.34, 0.64)  <0.001 
aThe reference group is before March 25. 
bExact 95% CI. 
cFisher exact test p value. rather than secondary infection (4,5). Excluding the Amoy
Gardens cases, the attack rates were 13.9% and 8%, respec-
tively. The SARS attack rates in the households therefore
were not negligible.
The names of the probable secondary cases provided
by the respondents were compared to the master list of
known probable cases. A recent study, conducted by the
Chinese University of Hong Kong, noted that none of the
94 asymptomatic family members of the SARS case-
patients tested positive for SARS in serologic tests (unpub.
data). Any underestimation due to asymptomatic transmis-
sion therefore should be minimal.
As the quarantine policy was only initiated on March
31 for the Amoy Gardens residents (12) , the median home
stay was longer for earlier onset SARS cases (4 days) than
the later ones (2 days). Both the household and the house-
hold member attack rates were much higher in the initial
phase of the epidemic (before March 25) (10) . Moreover,
between the first large-scale outbreak, which occurred
approximately March 12, 2003, and March 25, 2003, rela-
tively little was known about the disease, and hence mini-
mal preventive measures against secondary infections
were being practiced by household members (10).
Both the household and the household member attack
rates of hospital healthcare workers were much lower than
those of other types of households, even after controlling
for other variables that were significant in the multivariate
models. As compared to other households, less frequent
close contacts were made in the healthcare worker house-
holds. Only 14% of the household members in the health-
care worker household had made frequent close contact
(<1 m) with the index patient, as compared to 25% in the
other groups (p < 0.01). Similarly, the percentages of din-
ing together for >10 times during the reference period were
30.2% and 47.9%, respectively, for the healthcare worker
and non-healthcare worker households (p < 0.01). These
findings suggest that with a greater awareness and proper
preventive measures, secondary attacks of SARS among
household members may be greatly reduced.
Our data support the government’s suggestion that
environmental contamination was responsible for the large
number of SARS infections in the Amoy Gardens Block E
(4,5) but not in other Blocks of the Amoy Gardens. The
attack rates for the Amoy Block E households were much
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Table 4. Univariate analysis of associations between risk factors and Household Attack Rates 
Any probable secondary case  
within the household (%) 
Risk factor  Yes  No  Odds ratio (95% CI)  Chi-square p value
a 
Sex of index person (IP)         
Male (n = 400)  16.5  83.5  1.00  0.215 
Female (n = 481)  13.5  86.5  0.79 (0.55 to 1.15)   
Age of IP (y)
a         
<30 (n = 283)  7.4  92.6  1.00  <0.001 
31–40 (n = 197)  11.2  88.8  1.57 (0.84 to 2.93)   
41–50 (n = 165)  19.4  80.6  3.00 (1.67 to 5.41)   
51–60 (n = 76)  23.7  76.3  3.87 (1.94 to 7.73)   
>61 (n = 138)  23.2  76.8  3.77 (2.08 to 6.83)   
Type of IP         
Hospital workers (n = 267)  3.7  96.3  1.00  <0.001 
Amoy Gardens bock E residents (n = 36)  38.9  61.1  16.35 (6.51 to 41.08)   
Amoy Gardens other Block residents (n = 107)  19.6  80.4  6.28 (2.84 to 13.85)   
Other community members (n = 471)  18.3  81.7  5.74 (2.93 to 11.26)   
Date of IP’s fever onset 
b         
Before March 25 (n = 299)  22.4  77.6  1.00  <0.001 
On or after March 25 (n = 581)  11.0  89.0  0.43 (0.29 to 0.62)   
Duration IP stayed home between fever onset and 
hospitalization (d)
c 
       
<2 (n = 440)  9.3  90.7  1.00  <0.001 
3–5 (n = 268)  15.3  84.7  1.76 (1.11 to 2.79)   
>6 (n = 171)  28.7  71.3  3.91 (2.46 to 6.20)   
IP visited by any household member during 
hospitalization? 
       
No (n = 682)  12.6  87.4  1.00  0.001 
Yes (n = 199)  22.6  77.4  2.03 (1.36 to 3.03)   
Disinfection of IP’s quarters?         
Yes  15.2  84.8  1.00  0.884 
No  14.7  85.3  0.96 (0.66 to 1.40)   
aExcluded 22 missing persons. 
bExcluded 1 missing person. 
cExcluded 2 missing persons. higher than those for households of other Blocks (for later
onset households, household attack rates: 36% versus
13.4%; household member attack rates: 20.8% versus
7.7%), whereas the rates of the Amoy non-Block E house-
holds were comparable to those of the “other community
group” (for later onset households, household attack rates:
13.4% versus 13.1%; household member attack rates:
7.7% versus 7.2%). The observation that the median dura-
tion between the onset of symptoms in the index patient
and the “first” probable secondary case of the Amoy
Gardens cases were much shorter than those of the other
groups also supports the environmental contamination the-
ory that had been suggested to explain the Amoy Gardens
Block E outbreak.
Our data indicate that hospital visitations to the index
patient was another independent risk factor for contracting
SARS, suggesting that hospital visitors may have played
an important role in the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong.
Among all household members who had visited an index
patient in the hospital, 51 (16.5%) of 310 contracted SARS
(20.3% and 8.2%, respectively, for the earlier and later
onset groups). Moreover, our results demonstrated that the
risk was increased when both the SARS patient and the
visitor were not wearing a mask. Hence, stringent hospital
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Table 5. Summary of stepwise multivariate logistic regression model predicting “probable secondary infection” within the household 
level
a 
Risk factor  Coefficient  SE  Odds ratio (95% CI)  p value 
Type of Index Person (IP)         
Healthcare worker       1.00   
Amoy Gardens Block E residents   3.074  0.487  21.62 (8.33 to 56.10)  <0.001 
Amoy Gardens other Block residents   1.901  0.425  6.69 (2.91 to 15.39)  <0.001 
Other community member  1.705  0.354  5.50 (2.75 to 11.01)  <0.001 
Date of IP’s fever onset         
Before March 25       1.00   
On or after March 25  –0.696  0.235  0.50 (0.32 to 0.79)  <0.001 
Duration IP stayed home between fever onset and 
hospitalization (d)  
       
<2       1.00   
3–5   0.283  0.258  1.33 (0.80 to 2.20)  0.274 
>6   1.045  0.265  2.84 (1.69 to 4.78)  <0.001 
IP visited by any household member when hospitalized?          
No      1.00   
Yes  0.483  0.242  1.62 (1.01 to 2.60)  0.046 
aAge was not significant in the multivariable analysis. 
Table 6. Summary of multivariate logistic regression model predicting “probable secondary infection” of household members  
(N = 2,195) 
Risk factor  Coefficient  SE  Odds ratio (95% CI)  p value 
Type of Index Person (IP)         
Hospital care workers      1.00   
Amoy Gardens Block E residents  2.888  0.455  17.95 (7.35 to 43.83)  <0.001 
Amoy Gardens other Block residents  1.661  0.419  5.26 (2.32 to 11.95)  <0.001 
Other community members  1.387  0.352  4.01 (2.01 to 7.98)  <0.001 
IP visited by a household member         
Not visited by any      1.00   
Both with mask  0.571  0.412  1.77 (0.79 to 3.97)  0.166 
Either one with mask  0.483  0.429  1.62 (0.70 to 3.76)  0.260 
Both without mask  1.139  0.326  3.12 (1.65 to 5.91)  <0.001 
Frequency of close contact with IP (within 1 m)
a         
Never       1.00   
Seldom   0.466  0.338  1.59 (0.82 to 3.09)  0.168 
Occasionally  0.762  0.304  2.14 (1.18 to 3.89)  0.012 
Frequently  0.834  0.288  2.30 (1.31 to 4.05)  0.004 
Date of IP’s fever onset         
Before March 25      1.00   
On or after March 25  –0.681  0.220  0.51 (0.33 to 0.78)  0.002 
Duration IP stayed home between fever onset and 
hospitalization (d) 
       
≤2       1.00   
3–5  0.092  0.278  1.10 (0.64 to 1.89)  0.740 
≥ 6  0.655  0.278  1.93 (1.12 to 3.32)  0.018 
aInformation on 13 cases and 37 controls missing. visitation policies should be implemented and proper per-
sonal protection equipment should be required for all visi-
tors of SARS patients.
As a longer exposure period increased the risk for sec-
ondary SARS infection among household members, clear
public health messages encouraging people who develop
influenza-like symptoms to seek rapid medical treatment
and to use preventive measures should be disseminated.
An effective surveillance system should also be able to
substantially reduce the duration of home stay of the SARS
patients.
The frequency of close contact is another important risk
factor for household member attack rates. Together with
the significant association with index patient’s home stay
duration, these results suggest that viral load is important
in determining whether a secondary infection occurs. The
results are also highly consistent with droplet theory of
transmission but do not lend much support for transmis-
sion by fomites, particularly since the household attack
rate was not found to be significantly associated with thor-
ough disinfection of the living quarters.
When the data were stratified by Amoy Block E
households versus other households, household disinfec-
tion was significantly associated with the household mem-
ber attack rates in the former but not in the latter group
(Amoy Gardens: OR = 1.11; p = 0.56, exact test; other
households: OR = 0.24, p = 0.019, exact test; test for
homogeneity, p = 0.013). Similar results were also
obtained for the association between the household attack
rate in the two groups (OR = 1.12 and 0.4, respectively, for
Amoy Block E households and other households),
although the association in the Amoy Block E group was
not of statistical significance, possibly due to the small
sample size (36 such households in total). This finding
again strongly supports the claim that environmental con-
tamination occurred in Amoy Block E households and that
many of the cases were not secondary infections.
Moreover, it suggests that although household disinfection
was not a protective factor in the prevention of secondary
infection, its role in reducing the risk for environmental
infection cannot be dismissed. It is speculated that proba-
ble benefits of disinfection for protecting secondary infec-
tion might have been overridden by the effects of frequent
contacts with the index patient or hospital visits.
The study has a few limitations. First, there is no way to
confirm that the probable secondary infection of household
members actually came from the index patient. Nosocomial
infections, rather than secondary infections, may also have
occurred in some of the household members during hospi-
tal visits to the index patient, but it is not possible to distin-
guish the two scenarios. The possibility of household
members contracting the SARS virus in the community
outside the home was, however, very small. Nevertheless,
infection by environmental contamination has not been
implicated as a large source of SARS except among Amoy
Block E residents. Second, 44.6% of the time, information
was provided by the household member most familiar with
the household situation rather than the index patient. The
households interviewed by the index patients and the
households interviewed by proxy did not, however, differ
in the distribution of risk factors. Moreover, most Hong
Kong residents live in small apartments of <60 m
2, and
many avoided going out during the SARS epidemic; the
people were very sensitized to close contact to those with
SARS or flu-like symptoms (10) . Hence, although the
results may still be influenced by recall and reporting bias,
the amount of bias should not substantially alter the find-
ings. Third, even though recall bias may be another poten-
tial problem, almost all of the interviews were made with-
in 3 weeks after the index patient’s onset of fever; given the
extremely unusual nature of SARS, respondents should
have been able to reliably recall the requested information.
Fourth, the study was not able to cover all SARS patients
in Hong Kong, but after incorrect or unavailable contact
numbers were eliminated, 78.3% of all SARS patients had
been covered by this study, and the refusal rate was moder-
ate (10.5%). Finally, the case definition of SARS was non-
specific. Data on laboratory confirmation of the SARS
coronavirus were not available so it was possible that some
of the cases were in fact pneumonia rather than SARS. In
the later phase of the epidemic, it was possible that either
case-finding became more thorough or case-finding was
more specific as more information became more available.
Nevertheless, it is logical to argue that the secondary attack
rate declined in the later phase as the awareness was great-
ly heightened. It is emphasized that the figures reported in
this study are probable, rather than actual attack rates.
The study, being a large-scale study investigating
SARS transmission in the community setting, allows us to
have a better understanding of the infectivity, modes of
transmission, and prevention of SARS in a community set-
ting. It also gives insight into the prevention of secondary
SARS infection within the household.
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